agglomeration and unemployment and its implications for congestion taxes and investments in transport infrastructure. In particular, we formulate a model that introduces three important features of urban or regional economies. First, our setting includes regional labor markets and takes into account traffic congestion, commuting delays and compensating wage differentials. Second, the analysis considers unemployment of hourly workers, with varying unemployment rates across regions. Third, our modeling framework incorporates urban agglomeration with associated external economies of scale. We use a numerical version of this model to assess the extent to which secondbest optimal pricing departs from first-best rules of thumb. Our findings illustrate that a congestion tax for commuting towards the urban area may widen urban-rural wage gaps and unemployment differentials. Wages of skilled workers in the urban center rise because the congestion toll restricts the supply of skilled labor in the city. Production level in the city drops, which raises the unemployment rate. Interestingly, commuters do not necessarily bear the burden of the tax, as it is shifted to less mobile factors of production in the urban area, such as unskilled labor, land and capital. Furthermore, we illustrate that the model can also be used to assess the returns to transportation investment. Our results indicate that reducing travel delays by the same amount as is achieved by the toll requires an expansion of transport infrastructure of around 50%. Investing in transport infrastructure towards the urban center and congestion tolling appear to have opposite effects on urban unemployment.
The following section compares our approach with the existing literature. Section 3 presents the model. Next, we apply the spatial general equilibrium model to Belgium. We argue that our model is well-suited to address the Belgian case and present the data used for calibration in section 4. Results of the numerical simulations are presented in section 5. The final section summarizes the policy conclusions.
Literature review
When people decide where to work, they are likely to consider wage rates and travel times for different job locations. Individuals will not take into account that their commute affects other commuters through increased congestion and travel times. Therefore, economic efficiency calls for a congestion toll equal to the congestion externality cost (Pigouvian toll). Previous literature on congestion pricing argues that the optimal toll should be lowered from the Pigouvian level in the presence of agglomeration externalities (if no instrument is available to internalize the agglomeration externalities directly). This argument is set out by Arnott 2007 . Lowering the congestion toll will induce more commuting towards the city center. If this entails strong agglomeration benefits, a welfare gain may arise. Arnott develops a simple model to illustrate how the level of the optimal toll varies with the magnitude of congestion and agglomeration externalities. The benefits of agglomeration are represented by increasing productivity on the city level when the number of workers rises. For low levels of congestion and strong agglomeration economies, the optimal toll can become negative. In addition to agglomeration externalities, labor taxes reduce the net wage below the full social marginal product of workers. If travel is mainly for commuting purposes, reducing the toll stimulates labor supply. Therefore, high taxes on labor would lower the optimal toll further below the Pigouvian level. Arnott concludes that governments should consider the interplay between several positive and negative externalities when deciding on policy measures that aim to correct these market failures.
The idea that policy-makers should consider second best settings in their transport infrastructure choices is brought forward by Venables 2007 . His set-up includes two market failures. The first one is agglomeration economies that are external to the firm: output per worker depends on the total number of jobs in the city center. The second one arises because of distortionary labor taxes. When commuting costs are not tax deductible, the income tax distorts the spatial labor allocation because workers bear the full cost of commuting, but only gain a wage differential net of tax (for an in-depth treatment of this distortion, we refer to Wrede 2009 and Vandyck and Proost 2012) . Several mechanisms lead to higher benefits of transport investments than is accounted for in traditional cost-benefit analyses (i.e. direct commuting cost reductions): attracting more workers to the city where productivity is higher, boosting productivity and incomes of existing city workers and, as a consequence, raising more income tax revenue. The numerical simulations presented by Venables illustrate that the overall gain of urban transport improvements can more than double for reasonable values of income taxes and productivity increases due to agglomeration.
Urban economics literature has not focused exclusively on the efficiency of road pricing. A series of papers discusses distributional concerns. Zenou 2000 develops a monocentric city framework where firms and employed workers endogenously locate in the city center and the unemployed reside at the edge of the city where land is cheaper. The distinguishing features of the model are the endogenous location of firms and households, in combination with urban unemployment caused by efficiency wage setting. The efficiency wage is set higher than the market clearing wage to deter shirking and compensates for commuting costs. Because the unemployed reside far away from the location of jobs, they face high commuting costs. Therefore, the wage needed to induce the unemployed to start working will be raised further above the market clearing wage, leading to higher levels of unemployment. In short, a spatial mismatch arises because location decisions cause more people to be unemployed. Zenou shows that commuting subsidies for both unemployed and employed individuals can increase inequality via interactions in the land market. Borck and Wrede 2008 illustrate how commuting subsidies may have different effects for absentee landowners versus city residents: due to reduced commuting costs, individuals move out of the city. This reduces land prices in the city, which is beneficial for city residents. Landowners, however, will experience a drop in land rents. Furthermore, the authors argue that transport subsidies shift rents between rich and poor individuals. If the poor live in the city center and use public transport, subsidies for public transport will benefit the poor but will harm rich car drivers that live in the suburbs. On the contrary, a subsidy for travel by car is not necessarily harmful for the poor because it may relieve pressure on the housing market.
A third strand of literature looks at the effects of transportation policy in situations where unemployment exists due to labor market imperfections. Pilegaard and Fosgerau 2008 investigate the implications of search imperfections on the labor market for cost-benefit analyses of transport infrastructure investments. Because workers and firms lack perfect information, the matching process between unemployed workers and job vacancies takes some time. As a result, unemployment arises. Wages are determined through a Nash bargaining process between a union and the firms. In their job search, the unemployed trade off commuting distances and the expected duration of unemployment spells. Broadening the geographic scope of the job search may lead to longer commuting distances but a shorter duration of unemployment. An investment that lowers commuting costs now has indirect benefits because the jobless will expand their search area to other regions. This will lower total unemployment. A numerical simulation for Denmark illustrates that indirect effects raise the benefits of transport investment by almost 30% over the gains measured by traditional cost-benefit analyses. For other contributions we refer to De Borger 2009 and Zhu et al. 2009 . The former discusses congestion pricing in a rather specific setting with wage bargaining. Zhu et al. study the wider economic benefits of transport infrastructure investment using a spatial general equilibrium model with efficiency wage setting. However, they do not include interregional commuting and focus on transport of goods.
Our modeling framework combines several elements from the literature discussed above. First, as in Arnott (2007) and Venables (2007) , this paper includes congestion and agglomeration effects in the analysis of congestion pricing and transport infrastructure investments. In addition, we look into the impact variation between skilled and unskilled workers and across regions. This incidence study relates to the work of Zenou (2000) and Borck and Wrede (2008) . However, our set-up is different since we allow for congested commuting flows between multiple regions and neglect interactions via the residential land market. Finally, as in Pilegaard and Fosgerau 2008 , the model developed in this paper allows for the existence of unemployment. In addition, labor is heterogeneous. Our framework distinguishes between low-skilled hourly workers and high-skilled salaried workers. Furthermore, salaried workers from various regions offer differentiated services and are considered to be imperfect substitutes in production.
The model
The labor market model described in the following subsections distinguishes between hourly and salaried workers. Hourly workers do not commute and, if employed, they work in their region of residence. Regional hourly wages and unemployment rates are related through a wage curve with a long-run unemployment elasticity equal to -0.1.
The simplification that low-skilled, hourly workers do not commute can be rationalized in various ways. In countries where languages differ across regions, the lack of language skills among low-skilled workers may prevent them from searching for a job in a different region. Similarly, high-skilled workers may have better access to information on employment opportunities in other jurisdictions. In the US, low-quality public transport services may raise travel times for poor individuals who do not possess a car. This may restrict the job search area. Furthermore, Faggian et al. 2013 argue that lowskill individuals tend to search for jobs more locally, whereas high-skilled workers may travel larger distances to target specialized labor markets. Consequently, the level of human capital and the size of the employment search area are positively related.
On the supply side of the salaried labor market, we focus on the commuting decisions, assuming that a common utility function characterizes worker choices, whether they are employed in their region of residence or elsewhere. In this setting, wage differentials compensate for differences in commuting costs. Salaried employees work for 8 hours per day, and commuters experience a reduced number of leisure hours during the morning and evening.
The demand side of the salaried labor market is based on an Armington model in which workers are distinguished by region of origin. This means that salaried workers from different regions are viewed as imperfect substitutes in production. This assumption is relevant for instance when there are language differences across regions. The model thus accommodates regionally differentiated salaries (by region of employment and by region of residence). Labor demand functions are calibrated to a reference equilibrium with given commuting delays between pairs of markets.
Salaried workers
Salaried workers are employed fulltime but choose the region of employment. We assume their residence location is fixed. Individual utility for a salaried worker living in region i and working in region j is based on consumption of goods c i j and leisure i j ,
where θ is a vector of value shares of leisure (for all combinations of i and j ) and ρ is determined by the constant elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption, ρ = 1 − 1/σ. The same utility function applies to all salaried workers regardless of where they live or work. The household budget constraint for a consumer living in region i and working in j is given by:
in which M i j is extended income and ω i j is the shadow price of leisure for commuters.
The availability of leisure for an i j commuter is given by:
in which 3 is the maximum number of hours available for commuting and free time each morning and evening. Note that the availability of leisure is determined by the travel delay D i j between the location of residence i and employment j . Extended income is then composed of wages, the redistributed revenue of the toll receipts (can be negative if an individual pays the toll but receives only a fraction of the revenue, T i j < 0) and the value of leisure:
Note here that 8 is the number of hours worked per day, W i j is the imputed hourly wage for a salaried resident of region i working in region j , and T i j is the net distribution of toll revenues which are returned lump sum to the salaried population. We assume the congestion toll is levied by a federal government that redistributes the revenue to the salaried population in all regions. The net payment to workers living in i and working in j is then calculated as:
in which N i j is the number of commuters from region i working in j ,N is the salaried population in the country,T = i j 2τ i j N i j is total toll revenue (for morning and evening commutes) and τ i j is the toll applied for commuters going from region i to j , both in the morning and evening. Revenue is rebated in full, hence i j T i j = 0. A consumer "chooses" leisure and goods to maximize utility, disregarding returned toll revenues, hence:
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure and the consumer price index p i j is given by:
Equilibrium Sorting of salaried workers
The population of salaried workers living in region i is fixed and equal toN i . Commuters choose a place to work which maximizes welfare. In equilibrium, two arbitrage conditions determine commuter choices. First, commuting from i to j yields a welfare level U i j which is no higher than that which prevails for other salaried residents in
Second, all salaried residents of region i work somewhere:
Travel Time and Optimal Tolling
The delay on the i j arc of the transport network is given by:
where α i j is an exogenous parameter representing the uncongested travel time, β i j is the congestion parameter calibrated to flows and travel delays in a reference equilibrium, S i j is an index of the transport network capacity which is calibrated to unity in the reference equilibrium and γ = 4 by assumption (as in the standard BPR congestion function). We assume this specification is an aggregate over different transport modes. With information about average distances for commuters from i to j ,d i j , we can assign an open road travel time based on maximum speed (s ma x ):
Given reference period flowsN i j and commute timesD i j , we calibrate β i j as
The travel delay created by one additional driver on the i j link is given by:
In this expression, the congestion externality is given by the effect of the additional driver on the travel time for other commuters: γ (D i j − α i j ). In the absence of other distortions, the optimal (Pigouvian) toll is equal to the value of the induced delay, i.e.
The Market for Hourly Labor
Our model is comprised of salaried and hourly workers. Salaried workers commute between regions and provide differentiated services. Hourly employees work in their region of residence, and they are subject to unemployment. A "wage curve" characterizes the relationship between hourly wages and local unemployment. The microeconometric association between the level of pay has been established empirically and is consistent with a long-run elasticity of approximately -0.1 Blanchflower and Oswald (2005) . This implies that a doubling of a region's unemployment rate is consistent with a 10% reduction in regional hourly wage. The demand for hourly workers N H j is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function. The next section gives more details about the production structure. Hence, the market for hourly workers is given by:
in whichH j is the hourly workforce in region j , u j is the unemployment rate and N H j is the demand for hourly labor. The wage curve is given by:
in which ,ū j andv j are the unemployment and wage rate in the reference period, and we calibrate as (2) log(0.9) , such that a doubling in the unemployment rate is in accordance with a 10% drop in wages.
Regional production
Production is composed of hourly labor, salaried labor, land and capital. The previous subsection discussed the market for hourly labor in more detail. Figure 3 .5 gives a visual representation of the production structure. The first level of the nested production structure is represented by a Cobb-Douglas (elasticity of substitution σ L = 0) specification of hourly workers N H j and other inputs (land L j , capital K j and salaried workers N i j ). Aggregate production in region j is thus
η j ≥ 1 in this production function portrays external economies of scale through urban agglomeration 1 . Firms take these agglomeration benefits as given and consider their production process to be subject to constant returns to scale. The parameter φ j represents productivity in region j and will be set to 1 for all regions in the remainder of the chapter. On lower levels of the production structure we assume that a nested constant elasticity of substitution function characterizes the demand for land, capital and salaried workers from different regions. On the second level, an elasticity of substitu-
) describes substitution possibilities between land (L j ) and other inputs (capital, K j , and salaried labor, N i j ):
Remark that land is only used for production (e.g. farmland, office space,...) and that we do not consider residential land markets. A third elasticity
substitution between capital and salaried labor: Representative firms set production levels that maximize profits, taking agglomeration externalities as given. The zero profit condition then has the form:
is the price of land in region j and p K j is the price of capital. In a short-run framework, both land and capital are in fixed supply in each region with associated resource constraints which determine p L j and p K j . In the long-run, only the land constraint remains in place and the price of capital is fixed (equal to unity). Note that land and capital rents are not returned to workers. Instead, we assume that these rents flow to absentee land and capital owners.
4 Calibration of the model Table 1 presents Belgian data 2 used in the calibration of the model. High gross wages (row 4) in Brussels, the capital and most populated city of the country, attract over 350000 commuters on a daily basis. Columns 2-4 show that other interregional commuting flows are lower in volume. Average commuting times and distances (not shown here) are obtained from Census data (2001) . Flanders is the region with the highest income from employment (column 6; Regional Household Accounts, 2009) and the lowest unemployment rate. The regional disparities in terms of unemployment are large: the unemployment rate in the strongly urbanized area of Brussels is more than three times the unemployment rate in the more rural area of Flanders. In the light of a linguistic and cultural divide between the Belgian regions, the modeling of regional labor markets is highly relevant. In addition, the assumption that there is no interregional migration seems less strong in a country with a low degree of mobility. For a discussion on the role of language barriers as obstacles for labor market integration, we refer to Bartz and Fuchs-Schündeln 2012.
Region of
Region The high share of skilled salaried workers in production costs in Brussels illustrates the demand for highly educated workers in Brussels' service-oriented economy. Industries that use land and capital inputs more intensively appear to be more important in Flanders and Wallonia. Table 3 shows the exogenous values of the remaining parameters. The simulations presented in the next section show results for different values for the agglomeration externalities in Brussels. The simplest case does not consider agglomeration benefits (η B r u s s e l s = 1). In subsequent simulations we will assume that agglomeration externalities in Brussels are relatively strong (η B r u s s e l s = 1.1). Results for intermediate values of η B r u s s e l s (η B r u s s e l s = 1.01 and η B r u s s e l s = 1.05) can be found in the appendix. We assume that agglomeration benefits are absent in the regions with a lower density of people and jobs, i.e. Flanders and Wallonia. A high value for σ N indicates that skilled workers from different regions are rather good substitutes.
Parameter
Value η B r u s s e l s 1 / 1.01 / 1.05 / 1.1 η F l and e r s 1 
Results
To disentangle the effects of multiple externalities, we start with a simple scenario and add complexity along the way. The first scenario studies the effect of a first best congestion toll for commuting towards Brussels in a setting without agglomeration externalities and with a fixed level of unemployment. The congestion tax serves to internalize the congestion externality. The second type of scenario adds agglomeration benefits in Brussels to the analysis. The unemployment level is still kept fixed. The third subsection then combines congestion and agglomeration externalities with endogenous regional unemployment rates via the wage curve mechanism. Finally, we look into the benefits of transport investment in different settings.
Simple case: congestion externalities
The first scenario analyzes the economic impact of first best congestion taxes on two important and congested commuting links: from Flanders to Brussels (τ i j = 19.17 €) and from Wallonia to Brussels (τ i j = 19.16 €). For now, we do not consider agglomeration effects (η j = 1) and changes in unemployment rates (such that the supply of hourly labor is constant). Table 4 presents the results of the short run setting where both the total quantity of land and capital are fixed per region. The introduction of a congestion tax reduces the number of commuters towards Brussels by more than 20%. Consequently, the travel times on these links are strongly reduced: a drop of approximately 32% and 24% for commutes originating from Flanders and Wallonia respectively. This means both Flemish and Walloon commuters to Brussels now enjoy more than 15 minutes of additional leisure time every morning and evening. The urban-rural wage gap increases for two reasons. First, the congestion tax raises commuting costs. The wage differential that compensates commuters for the trip must therefore also increase. Second, shifting skilled workers employed in Brussels to their region of residence lowers the supply of skilled labor in Brussels and increases the supply of salaried labor in Flanders and Wallonia. As a consequence, wages for skilled workers rise in Brussels but drop in the other regions. Note that some of the commuters are replaced by residents of Brussels. Due to higher wages, they now prefer to work in their region of residence. In turn, this leads to a lower number of individuals that commutes outward from the urban area of Brussels, leading to lower travel times on these links as well. Note that the toll is paid by salaried commuters towards Brussels only, but the revenue is redistributed to all salaried workers in the country (also to non-commuting salaried workers, but not to hourly workers). This is reflected in the changes in extended income.
The higher cost of skilled labor in Brussels, where salaried labor is intensively used as a factor of production, results in a strong decrease of the production level in that region. The reduction in capital rents is less strong, as firms may demand more capital to replace expensive salaried workers in the production process. This reasoning can be reversed for the other regions: skilled labor is now cheaper, the production level increases and the return on capital drops because firms prefer to hire more skilled workers instead of capital. Furthermore, the changes in production levels appear to be capitalized into the land prices. Interestingly, the tax on commuters does not have a negative impact on the utility level of salaried workers, but is absorbed by other factors of production, particularly land. The reason is that skilled labor is mobile and adjusts to the toll by changing the region of employment. Therefore, the burden of the tax falls on the fixed production factors: land and capital. Return on land in Brussels decreases more than the production level. This can be explained by the assumption that land is not easily substituted for in production. With σ L = 0.5, land is a gross complement for capital and labor: in addition to the drop in the production level, the increase in the wage of skilled workers leads to a further decrease in the demand for land.
The utility levels of all salaried workers increase. This is particularly the case for salaried workers living in Brussels: they benefit from higher wages and receive part of the toll revenue without paying congestion taxes. Commuters towards Brussels enjoy more leisure time because of reduced traffic congestion, earn higher wages but have to pay the congestion tax. As for individuals living and working in Flanders or Wallonia, they now receive lower wages, but also get a share of the redistributed toll revenue. Note that residents of the more rural areas gain from the introduction of the congestion tax, even though income is shifted towards residents of the urban center (since they receive a share of the tax revenue): the toll ensures a more efficient allocation of workers over different regions. Remark that we have assumed that the revenue of the congestion tax is only redistributed to salaried workers. In case the government decides to redistribute the toll revenue as a lump sum transfer to both hourly and salaried workers in the country, the results look different. Salaried workers that reside in Brussels still see an increase in their utility level (by 2.18%), but skilled workers living in Flanders and Wallonia experience a small drop in utility of 0.04% and 0.11% respectively. Therefore, the mechanism through which the additional revenue is recycled plays an important role for the distributional impact of congestion pricing. Table 5 : The effects of a first-best congestion toll in the long run Table 5 presents the results of the long run scenario with Pigouvian congestion taxes. In the long run, capital is perfectly mobile and the price of capital is fixed. Production and the price of land decrease in all regions compared to the short run scenario. Compared to the benchmark, the price of land in Brussels now drops with 16.70%. Part of the burden that fell on capital in the short run is now transferred to the fixed factor of land. The rest of the results is hardly affected. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will only consider the short run scenario.
Congestion and agglomeration externalities
Agglomeration externalities arise when a firm's productivity is influenced by the total level of output in the region. A single firm will not take into account the positive effect of it's output level on other firms' productivity. As a result, firms will produce less than socially optimal. In a competitive labor market, workers will earn a wage equal to the private marginal product of labor, which is now lower than the social marginal product. The gap between both distorts commuting decisions. The government could therefore consider stimulating production in urban areas where agglomeration benefits are strong. However, the congestion tax introduced in the previous section does the opposite: the output level in Brussels decreases by 8.14% (see table 4 ). This section incorporates agglomeration economies explicitly by adding external economies of scale in Brussels to the analysis. This enables us to study the interaction between congestion and agglomeration externalities. We will assume that there are only agglomeration externalities in Brussels (η B r u s s e l s = 1.10). Results for intermediate values of the parameter that indicates the strength of increasing returns to scale on the aggregate level (η B r u s s e l s = 1.01 and η B r u s s e l s = 1.05) are displayed in appendix A.
Due to the external economies of scale, the (social) marginal product increases with the level of output in the urban area. Consequently, when less people work in Brussels, total output decreases such that (social) marginal productivity drops. The fall in (social) marginal productivity was not considered in section 5.1, where we assume that aggregate production is subject to constant returns to scale. This explains why the production level in Brussels now decreases stronger, as displayed in table 6: output drops by 9.27% compared to 8.14% in the scenario without agglomeration economies. Again, the negative effect on production is capitalized into the price of land for production. In addition, rents on capital and salaried wages in Brussels are lower than in the scenario without agglomeration benefits. As a result, Brussels is a less attractive place to work: commuting flows towards the capital further decline, which reduces toll revenue and travel times towards Brussels. Also, outward commuting from Brussels increases compared to the scenario without agglomeration externalities. This expands the supply of skilled workers in the neighboring regions, such that wage rates and incomes of all salaried workers decrease in comparison with the scenario of the previous section. Nevertheless, the existence of agglomeration externalities erodes only a fraction of the utility gain of skilled workers that arises as a consequence of congestion pricing: residents of Brussels see an increase in their utility level of 2.56% compared to the benchmark situation without congestion taxes, whereas residents of the other regions gain approximately 0.9% in utility. When the toll revenue is redistributed to both hourly and salaried workers in the country, the increase in the utility level of residents of Brussels reduces to 1.68%; inhabitants from Flanders and Wallonia then experience a utility loss of 0.17 and 0.25 respectively. In summary, the introduction of a first best congestion tax is less attractive for salaried workers and capital owners in the presence of agglomeration externalities.
Losses for landowners in Brussels are greater than in a situation without agglomeration economies, whereas owners of land used for production in Flanders and Wallonia now have more to gain from congestion taxes. Table 6 : The effects of a first-best congestion toll: short run, η B r u s s e l s = 1.10.
Congestion, agglomeration and unemployment
In 2011, more than 20% of the EU budget was spent on reducing regional inequalities in Europe (the convergence objective of the Structural Funds). Although the objective was formulated in terms of regional GDP per capita, policymakers are increasingly concerned with regional unemployment disparities. For policies with an impact on interregional mobility, it therefore makes sense to study the effect on regional unemployment rates. The simulation presented here adds endogenous unemployment rates via the wage curve mechanism to the analysis of the previous section. This set-up thus allows us to study unemployment changes of a congestion tax, accounting for congestion and agglomeration externalities (η B r u s s e l s = 1.10). Table 7 illustrates that the drop in production leads to a higher number of unemployed individuals in Brussels. The unemployment rate rises from 16% to approximately 21%. Accordingly, the wage of hourly workers in the urban area declines with 3.89%. As the production level in Flanders and Wallonia goes up, the demand for unskilled hourly workers increases, which drives their wages upwards. Correspondingly, unemployment rates in these regions slightly drop. As a result, the disparity in unemployment rates between Brussels and the surrounding regions grows. Note that the wage of hourly workers and the unemployment rate move in opposite directions in all regions, as captured by the wage curve. As a side effect of endogenizing the supply of hourly labor, we observe that wages of salaried workers, land and capital rents in Brussels decrease compared to the scenario in the previous section. As the use of hourly workers in the production process is no longer fixed, firms adjust the input share of unskilled workers, which places a higher burden on other factors of production. This reduces the gain in utility of salaried workers only slightly. The main result is therefore that the congestion tax causes a divergence in regional unemployment rates. Table 7 : First-best congestion toll: η B r u s s e l s = 1.10 and unemployment effects.
Investments in transport infrastructure
Governments usually have a set of instruments available for transport policy. In addition to congestion taxes, decisions are made regarding public infrastructure investments. This section studies the impact of expanding the capacity of the transport network (S i j ) towards Brussels in a setting with congestion, agglomeration (η B r u s s e l s = 1.10), endogenous unemployment and first best congestion taxes on the transport links towards Brussels. We assume the infrastructure investments are financed by lump sum taxes. This way, we can neglect the effect of distortionary taxes needed to cover the cost of the investment and we can focus on the benefit side of transport infrastructure investments.
The left of figure 5 .4 illustrates the decrease in commuting time from Flanders 4 to Brussels (on the vertical axis) as a consequence of expanding the transport capacity towards Brussels with 0-50% (on the horizontal axis). Two scenarios are shown: one without congestion taxes, the other with a Pigouvian toll for commuters towards Brussels. In case there is no toll, a capacity increase of 10% reduces travel times by approximately 8%. The figure illustrates that the investment needed to reduce travel times by as much as the toll raises the network capacity by almost 50%. Note that the number of commuters to Brussels increases when the transport network expands. A toll, on the contrary, regulates travel times by reducing the number of commuters.
The right-hand side of figure 5.4 presents the implications for unemployment in the urban area of Brussels. As indicated in the previous section, the congestion tax raises the unemployment rate in Brussels by nearly 5 percentage points. This is driven by a reduction in commuting flow, a rise in the cost of skilled labor and a decline in the production level. Investments in transport infrastructure have the opposite effect, as they lead to a rise in the number of commuters towards Brussels, a lower cost of skilled labor and higher production levels in Brussels. Therefore, infrastructure investments result in a regional convergence in terms of unemployment rates. 
Policy conclusions and further research
This paper develops a model of bi-directional commuting between multiple regions to study the economic impact of congestion taxes and transport investments. The model combines congestion, agglomeration externalities and unemployment of hourly workers. The approach enables us to analyze distributional effects between mobile skilled (or salaried) and immobile unskilled (or hourly) workers. In addition, numerical simulations study the incidence of congestion taxes on the transport links towards Brussels over different factors of production and over several regions.
Our findings show that, contrary to popular belief, commuters may gain from the introduction of a congestion toll, as it improves the efficiency of the allocation of workers over different regions. This result is dependent on the redistribution of the toll revenue: it holds when the revenue is shared between all potential commuters (i.e. the skilled workers, in our set-up). When the tax revenue is redistributed to both salaried and hourly workers, skilled residents of the more rural regions (Flanders and Wallonia) suffer a limited welfare loss. Salaried workers living in the strongly urbanized region of Brussels still gain because they do not pay the congestion tax but receive part of the tax revenue, and their wage rises. The production level in Brussels falls, which is reflected in losses for land and capital owners in this region. Furthermore, the congestion tax widens the urban-rural wage gap.
Incorporating substantial agglomeration effects in Brussels does not change the results drastically. In the presence of agglomeration externalities, the introduction of first best congestion taxes appears to be less beneficial for all salaried workers and more detrimental for all capital owners. Furthermore, our analysis illustrates how congestion tolls may lead to interregional unemployment polarization. The production level in the urban area of Brussels, where unemployment is higher than in the surrounding regions, drops. Neighboring regions Flanders and Wallonia see a relatively small increase in output and a decrease in unemployment rate. The result is a divergence of regional unemployment rates. Finally, we look into a situation where the government has two instruments for transport policy: congestion taxes and transport infrastructure investments. A substantial increase in transport network capacity is needed to reduce travel times by as much as would be achieved by the congestion toll. The reason is that the number of commuters increases when the transport capacity expands. Contrary to congestion taxes, investments in transport infrastructure towards Brussels reduce urban unemployment. The optimal mix of instruments will therefore depend on the objectives of policymakers.
Finally, we point out some suggestions for further research. First, the introduction of a congestion toll is potentially more beneficial when the additional revenue is used to lower other distortionary taxes. Our framework could easily be extended to incorporate this idea. However, this argument is pointed out clearly by Parry and Bento 2001 and Van Dender 2008 and would reduce the tractability of our results. Another mechanism that is left undiscussed is the interaction via the residential land markets, since our framework only considers land used for production. Our setting could be extended to allow for interregional household migration. This interaction may be important in countries with high levels of household mobility because we can expect that more people want to migrate to the city as a response to congestion taxes. In addition, the interaction between regional governments with local policy instruments could be included in the analysis. Finally, the analysis presented here can be expanded to cover more regions, as production and unemployment clusters also arise on lower geographic levels. Table 12 : First-best congestion toll: long run, η B r u s s e l s = 1.10 and unemployment.
